

FIRST-ORDER LOGIC

CHAPTER 8

Chapter 8 1

Outline

- ◇ Why FOL?
- ◇ Syntax and semantics of FOL
- ◇ Fun with sentences
- ◇ Wumpus world in FOL

Chapter 8 2

Pros and cons of propositional logic

- ☺ Propositional logic is **declarative**: pieces of syntax correspond to facts
- ☺ Propositional logic allows partial/disjunctive/negated information (unlike most data structures and databases)
- ☺ Propositional logic is **compositional**:
meaning of $B_{1,1} \wedge P_{1,2}$ is derived from meaning of $B_{1,1}$ and of $P_{1,2}$
- ☺ Meaning in propositional logic is **context-independent** (unlike natural language, where meaning depends on context)
- ☹ Propositional logic has very limited expressive power (unlike natural language)
E.g., cannot say “pits cause breezes in adjacent squares”
except by writing one sentence for each square

Chapter 8 3

First-order logic

Whereas propositional logic assumes world contains **facts**, first-order logic (like natural language) assumes the world contains

- **Objects**: people, houses, numbers, theories, Ronald McDonald, colors, baseball games, wars, centuries . . .
- **Relations**: red, round, bogus, prime, multistoried . . . , brother of, bigger than, inside, part of, has color, occurred after, owns, comes between, . . .
- **Functions**: father of, best friend, third inning of, one more than, end of . . .

Chapter 8 4

Logics in general

Language	Ontological Commitment	Epistemological Commitment
Propositional logic	facts	true/false/unknown
First-order logic	facts, objects, relations	true/false/unknown
Temporal logic	facts, objects, relations, times	true/false/unknown
Probability theory	facts	degree of belief
Fuzzy logic	facts + degree of truth	known interval value

Atomic sentences

Atomic sentence = $predicate(term_1, \dots, term_n)$
or $term_1 = term_2$

Term = $function(term_1, \dots, term_n)$
or *constant* or *variable*

E.g., $Brother(KingJohn, RichardTheLionheart)$
 $> (Length(LeftLegOf(Richard)), Length(LeftLegOf(KingJohn)))$

Syntax of FOL: Basic elements

Constants $KingJohn, 2, UCB, \dots$
 Predicates $Brother, >, \dots$
 Functions $Sqrt, LeftLegOf, \dots$
 Variables x, y, a, b, \dots
 Connectives $\wedge \vee \neg \Rightarrow \Leftrightarrow$
 Equality $=$
 Quantifiers $\forall \exists$

Complex sentences

Complex sentences are made from atomic sentences using connectives

$\neg S, S_1 \wedge S_2, S_1 \vee S_2, S_1 \Rightarrow S_2, S_1 \Leftrightarrow S_2$

E.g. $Sibling(KingJohn, Richard) \Rightarrow Sibling(Richard, KingJohn)$
 $>(1, 2) \vee \leq(1, 2)$
 $>(1, 2) \wedge \neg >(1, 2)$

Truth in first-order logic

Sentences are true with respect to a **model** and an **interpretation**

Model contains ≥ 1 objects (**domain elements**) and relations among them

Interpretation specifies referents for

constant symbols \rightarrow objects

predicate symbols \rightarrow relations

function symbols \rightarrow functional relations

An atomic sentence $predicate(term_1, \dots, term_n)$ is true

iff the objects referred to by $term_1, \dots, term_n$

are in the relation referred to by $predicate$

Truth example

Consider the interpretation in which

Richard \rightarrow Richard the Lionheart

John \rightarrow the evil King John


Brother \rightarrow the brotherhood relation

Under this interpretation, $Brother(Richard, John)$ is true

just in case Richard the Lionheart and the evil King John

are in the brotherhood relation in the model

Models for FOL: Example



Models for FOL: Lots!

Entailment in propositional logic can be computed by enumerating models

We **can** enumerate the FOL models for a given KB vocabulary:

For each number of domain elements n from 1 to ∞

For each k -ary predicate P_k in the vocabulary

For each possible k -ary relation on n objects

For each constant symbol C in the vocabulary

For each choice of referent for C from n objects ...

Computing entailment by enumerating FOL models is not easy!

Universal quantification

\forall (variables) (sentence)

Everyone at Berkeley is smart:

$\forall x \text{ At}(x, \text{Berkeley}) \Rightarrow \text{Smart}(x)$

$\forall x P$ is true in a model m iff P is true with x being **each** possible object in the model

Roughly speaking, equivalent to the conjunction of instantiations of P

$(\text{At}(\text{KingJohn}, \text{Berkeley}) \Rightarrow \text{Smart}(\text{KingJohn}))$
 $\wedge (\text{At}(\text{Richard}, \text{Berkeley}) \Rightarrow \text{Smart}(\text{Richard}))$
 $\wedge (\text{At}(\text{Berkeley}, \text{Berkeley}) \Rightarrow \text{Smart}(\text{Berkeley}))$
 $\wedge \dots$

Existential quantification

\exists (variables) (sentence)

Someone at Stanford is smart:

$\exists x \text{ At}(x, \text{Stanford}) \wedge \text{Smart}(x)$

$\exists x P$ is true in a model m iff P is true with x being **some** possible object in the model

Roughly speaking, equivalent to the disjunction of instantiations of P

$(\text{At}(\text{KingJohn}, \text{Stanford}) \wedge \text{Smart}(\text{KingJohn}))$
 $\vee (\text{At}(\text{Richard}, \text{Stanford}) \wedge \text{Smart}(\text{Richard}))$
 $\vee (\text{At}(\text{Stanford}, \text{Stanford}) \wedge \text{Smart}(\text{Stanford}))$
 $\vee \dots$

A common mistake to avoid

Typically, \Rightarrow is the main connective with \forall

Common mistake: using \wedge as the main connective with \forall :

$\forall x \text{ At}(x, \text{Berkeley}) \wedge \text{Smart}(x)$

means “Everyone is at Berkeley and everyone is smart”

Another common mistake to avoid

Typically, \wedge is the main connective with \exists

Common mistake: using \Rightarrow as the main connective with \exists :

$\exists x \text{ At}(x, \text{Stanford}) \Rightarrow \text{Smart}(x)$

is true if there is anyone who is not at Stanford!

$\exists x \neg \text{At}(x, \text{Stanford}) \vee \text{Smart}(x)$

just needs one person not at Stanford to make the sentence true.

Properties of quantifiers

$\forall x \forall y$ is the same as $\forall y \forall x$

$\exists x \exists y$ is the same as $\exists y \exists x$

$\exists x \forall y$ is **not** the same as $\forall y \exists x$

$\exists x \forall y \text{ Loves}(x, y)$

“There is a person who loves everyone in the world”

$\forall y \exists x \text{ Loves}(x, y)$

“Everyone in the world is loved by at least one person”

Quantifier duality: each can be expressed using the other

$\forall x \text{ Likes}(x, \text{IceCream}) \quad \neg \exists x \neg \text{Likes}(x, \text{IceCream})$

$\exists x \text{ Likes}(x, \text{Broccoli}) \quad \neg \forall x \neg \text{Likes}(x, \text{Broccoli})$

Fun with sentences

Brothers are siblings

Fun with sentences

Brothers are siblings

$\forall x, y \text{ Brother}(x, y) \Rightarrow \text{Sibling}(x, y)$.

“Sibling” is symmetric

Fun with sentences

Brothers are siblings

$\forall x, y \text{ Brother}(x, y) \Rightarrow \text{Sibling}(x, y)$.

“Sibling” is symmetric

$\forall x, y \text{ Sibling}(x, y) \Leftrightarrow \text{Sibling}(y, x)$.

One’s mother is one’s female parent

Fun with sentences

Brothers are siblings

$\forall x, y \text{ Brother}(x, y) \Rightarrow \text{Sibling}(x, y).$

“Sibling” is symmetric

$\forall x, y \text{ Sibling}(x, y) \Leftrightarrow \text{Sibling}(y, x).$

One’s mother is one’s female parent

$\forall x, y \text{ Mother}(x, y) \Leftrightarrow (\text{Female}(x) \wedge \text{Parent}(x, y)).$

A first cousin is a child of a parent’s sibling

Fun with sentences

Brothers are siblings

$\forall x, y \text{ Brother}(x, y) \Rightarrow \text{Sibling}(x, y).$

“Sibling” is symmetric

$\forall x, y \text{ Sibling}(x, y) \Leftrightarrow \text{Sibling}(y, x).$

One’s mother is one’s female parent

$\forall x, y \text{ Mother}(x, y) \Leftrightarrow (\text{Female}(x) \wedge \text{Parent}(x, y)).$

A first cousin is a child of a parent’s sibling

$\forall x, y \text{ FirstCousin}(x, y) \Leftrightarrow \exists p, ps \text{ Parent}(p, x) \wedge \text{Sibling}(ps, p) \wedge \text{Parent}(ps, y)$

Equality

$term_1 = term_2$ is true under a given interpretation if and only if $term_1$ and $term_2$ refer to the same object

E.g., $\forall x \times (\text{Sqrt}(x), \text{Sqrt}(x)) = x$ are satisfiable
 $2 = 2$ is valid

E.g., definition of (full) *Sibling* in terms of *Parent*:

$\forall x, y \text{ Sibling}(x, y) \Leftrightarrow [\neg(x = y) \wedge \exists m, f \neg(m = f) \wedge \text{Parent}(m, x) \wedge \text{Parent}(f, x) \wedge \text{Parent}(m, y) \wedge \text{Parent}(f, y)]$

Interacting with FOL KBs

Suppose a wumpus-world agent is using an FOL KB and perceives a smell and a breeze (but no glitter) at $t = 5$:

$\text{Tell}(KB, \text{Percept}([\text{Smell}, \text{Breeze}, \text{None}], 5))$

$\text{Ask}(KB, \exists a \text{ Action}(a, 5))$

I.e., does KB entail any particular actions at $t = 5$?

Answer: *Yes*, $\{a/\text{Shoot}\}$ ← substitution (binding list)

Given a sentence S and a substitution σ ,

$S\sigma$ denotes the result of plugging σ into S ; e.g.,

$S = \text{Smarter}(x, y)$

$\sigma = \{x/\text{Hillary}, y/\text{Bill}\}$

$S\sigma = \text{Smarter}(\text{Hillary}, \text{Bill})$

$\text{Ask}(KB, S)$ returns some/all σ such that $KB \models S\sigma$

Knowledge base for the wumpus world

“Perception”

$\forall b, g, t \text{ Percept}([Smell, b, g], t) \Rightarrow Smelt(t)$

$\forall s, b, t \text{ Percept}([s, b, Glitter], t) \Rightarrow AtGold(t)$

Reflex: $\forall t \text{ AtGold}(t) \Rightarrow \text{Action}(\text{Grab}, t)$

Reflex with internal state: do we have the gold already?

$\forall t \text{ AtGold}(t) \wedge \neg \text{Holding}(\text{Gold}, t) \Rightarrow \text{Action}(\text{Grab}, t)$

Holding(Gold, t) is not a percept

⇒ keeping track of change is essential

Summary

First-order logic:

- objects and relations are semantic primitives
- syntax: constants, functions, predicates, equality, quantifiers

Increased expressive power: sufficient to define wumpus world

Deducing hidden properties

Properties of locations:

$\forall x, t \text{ At}(\text{Agent}, x, t) \wedge \text{Smelt}(t) \Rightarrow \text{Smelly}(x)$

$\forall x, t \text{ At}(\text{Agent}, x, t) \wedge \text{Breeze}(t) \Rightarrow \text{Breezy}(x)$

Squares are breezy near a pit:

Diagnostic rule—infer cause from effect

$\forall y \text{ Breezy}(y) \Rightarrow \exists x \text{ Pit}(x) \wedge \text{Adjacent}(x, y)$

Causal rule—infer effect from cause

$\forall x, y \text{ Pit}(x) \wedge \text{Adjacent}(x, y) \Rightarrow \text{Breezy}(y)$

Neither of these is complete—e.g., the causal rule doesn't say whether squares far away from pits can be breezy

Definition for the *Breezy* predicate:

$\forall y \text{ Breezy}(y) \Leftrightarrow [\exists x \text{ Pit}(x) \wedge \text{Adjacent}(x, y)]$